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Introduction 
Engineering educators have an essential role in preparing engineers to work in a complex, 
interdisciplinary workforce. While much engineering education focuses on teaching students to 
develop disciplinary expertise in specific engineering domains, there is a strong need to teach 
engineers about the knowledge that they develop or use in their work (Bucciarelli 1994, Allenby 
& Sarewitz, 2011; Frodeman, 2013). The purpose of this research is to gain a better 
understanding of the knowledge systems of practicing engineers through observations of their 
practices such that the insights learned can guide future education efforts. Using an example 
from a complex and interdisciplinary engineering project, this paper presents a case study 
overviewing the types of epistemological (or knowledge-acquiring or –using) complexities that 
engineers navigate1. Specifically, we looked at a discussion of the thermal design of a CubeSat 
that occurred during an engineering review at NASA. We analyzed the review using a 
framework that we call ‘peak events,’ or pointed discussions between reviewers, project 
engineers, and managers. We examined the dialog within peak events to identify the ways that 
knowledge was brought to bear, highlighting discussions of uncertainty and the boundaries of 
knowledge claims. We focus on one example discussion surrounding the thermal design of the 
CubeSat, which provides a particularly thorough example of a knowledge system since the 
engineers present explained, justified, negotiated, and defended knowledge within a social 
setting. Engineering students do not get much practice or instruction in explicitly negotiating 
knowledge systems and epistemic standards in this way. We highlight issues that should matter 
to engineering educators, such as the need to discuss what level of uncertainty is sufficient and 
the need to negotiate boundaries of system responsibility. Although this analysis is limited to a 
single discussion or ‘peak event,’ our case shows that this type of discussion can occur in 
engineering and suggests that it could be important for future engineering education research.  
Background 
Many of the engineering challenges that society faces today require the expertise of 
engineers from an array of disciplines. Each discipline is assumed to bring a specialized 
knowledge set that enables individuals to address specific components of a project (Frodeman, 
2013). Components of a project are rarely isolated but instead are highly interrelated, which 
requires efficient coordination across disciplinary boundaries. Viewing the full set of discussions 
                                                      
1 Epistemology refers to the study of knowledge, and we use that phrase here to refer to key elements tied to 
knowledge claims that surround discussions in an engineering review. The debate about what is knowledge versus 
what is belief has been thoroughly assessed, with the literature shifting focus from defining knowledge simply as 
‘justified, true belief’ (Steup 2005). This paper focuses one epistemic issues found in the case study, including 
determining the appropriate level of uncertainty as well as the negotiation of what the system boundary (and 
associated knowledge claims) would be.  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170004874 2019-08-29T22:26:05+00:00Z
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about knowledge across a project as a ‘knowledge system’ is one way to study the inter-relation 
between people, tests, institutions and general scientific knowledge as is structured across 
multiple disciplines. For example, organizational studies research has looked at how knowledge 
coordination occurs across different departments (for example Product Sales and Engineering) 
but few studies exist about how engineers negotiate among themselves and coordinate the 
knowledge required for large, intricate engineering problems (Carlile, 2002). A significant 
challenge in studying interdisciplinary knowledge is that it can only be observed through careful 
analysis of social interactions (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Robbins 
& Aydede, 2009). Studying the social interactions among the individuals of a community 
requires direct observation in order to capture the intricacies of the system. Therefore, the 
research presented here utilized ethnography-inspired observations to study the interaction 
between different domains of knowledge.  
Setting 
We observed a knowledge system in action by attending a design review of an 
engineering project. The review was a Critical Design Review (CDR), which is generally 
performed as a project’s design is nearing completion (NASA 2007). The purpose of the review 
was to present a thorough overview of the technical plans for the project to an Independent 
Review Team, which used a mixed set of technical expertise to assess the project2.  This CDR 
differed somewhat from traditional CDRs because some subsystems were known to still need 
additional work, which is a consequence of the development timing and schedule constraints. 
Additionally, CubeSats for exploration beyond Earth orbit are relatively new within NASA 
history, and this particular project was targeting flight on a launch vehicle that is still in 
development.  
The goal of the BioSentinel project is to measure the effects of radiation on DNA in deep 
space in preparation for sending humans to Mars (NASA, n.d.). It will carry specially 
designed strains of yeast that respond to radiation in different ways. BioSentinel is what NASA 
calls a “6U CubeSat,” which means it is a solar-powered spacecraft about the size of a shoe 
box that needs to be launched into orbit on a rocket or shuttle.  CubeSats have become a 
relatively common way of sending small scientific payloads into space using a standard sized 
container. Many of the technical challenges involved are in getting the instrument to function 
and be self-sufficient within the parameters of the CubeSat footprint. BioSentinel will be loaded 
into a dispenser on the Space Launch System (SLS) which will carry it into deep space3. The 
dispenser is a chassis with set dimensions that secures the CubeSat during launch to the SLS and 
ejects it in outer space. Once loaded, the CubeSat will be inaccessible and must be prepared to 
sustain ambient conditions in Cape Canaveral, FL for 6 months.  Outside the Earth’s atmosphere 
BioSentinel will be ejected from the SLS along with 10 other CubeSats.  Once in space 
                                                      
2 For more context on NASA’s design review process, see NASA 2007. The CDR review is used as a key milestone 
for the agency to decide that a project can move forward into formal implementation. It is the review prior to the 
Critical Design Review, which is colloquially referred to as the point where engineers start to ‘cut hardware.’ 
3 The Space Launch System was announced by NASA in 2011 (NASA 2011), with a first flight now projected for 
late 2018, The existence of BioSentinel and other SLS secondary payloads was added in 2015 to SLS’s planned first 
flight, with the secondary payloads being set to deploy after launch of the Orion spacecraft (NASA 2015). 
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BioSentinel will maneuver itself to make measurements, charge its batteries and transmit data 
back to dish arrays on Earth.   
Methods 
We used an ethnography-inspired situative approach to study the knowledge system of 
practicing engineers based on observable knowledge practices. Observable knowledge practices 
include interactions between people that require them to explain, justify, defend, and negotiate 
knowledge claims (Duschl, Ellengoben, & Erduran, 1999; Wooley & Lin, 2005). The design 
review therefore provided a unique opportunity to witness how knowledge is exchanged and 
negotiated within a complex, interdisciplinary setting because it brought together the scientists 
and engineers on the project to present their plans to an external review team with diverse 
technical backgrounds.  
 Data collection occurred during the design review by three researchers who used 
ethnographic methods to inform their observations and note-taking (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 
2011). Observational notes in the form of jottings were recorded during the review. Jottings are 
“-a brief written record of events and impressions captured in key words and phrases” (Emerson 
et al., 2011, p. 29). At the end of each day, the researchers worked collectively to review their 
jottings and create field notes. The jottings focused on a combination of direct quotes, a 
summary of what was being spoken about, and any researcher comments or personal thoughts 
that occurred.  
We spent three months prior to the design review interacting with the Project Manager 
and learning about the BioSentinel project and team members to help situate ourselves in the 
project landscape. Being familiar with the project allowed us to focus on taking jottings about the 
knowledge system during the design review (Emerson et al., 2011).  The purpose of our 
comments were to reveal aspects that were not explicitly conveyed during the presentation. An 
example of the format of the jottings can be found in Table 1.  
Nearly all of the discussions centered on presentations supported by projected slides.  We 
were given access to the presentation slides and considered them in parallel with our jottings 
during analysis. Jottings were compared across researchers to ensure as many details as possible 
are presented and to present the reader with the most accurate description of the design review.  
Table 1. Example of researcher jottings during the design review. 
Topic/Slide 
Title or # 
Direct Quotes Gist/Summary Comments/Personal 
Thoughts 
Predicted 
total heating 
 
 
 
 
“Have you looked 
at worst case 
scenario when the 
transponder, cards, 
etc are on?” 
-model shows that they need 
about 2.6 Watts to run 2 cards at 
the same time 
 
 
-have looked at it but not when 
transponder turns on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-flexible design to 
account for worse 
case 
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The analysis started with identifying peak events that occurred during the design review. 
“Peak events” were defined as exchanges where the project expert had to explain, justify, 
negotiate, or defend a knowledge claim and resulted in successive questions about the same 
specific content.  Peak events are a useful lens to gain insight about the overall knowledge 
system because they can represent moments where different understandings and disciplinary 
perspectives emerge (Wooley & Lin, 2005). One example of peak events was during the thermal 
design presentation where two peak events were observed. The discussion presented here about 
the thermal environment is a good demonstration of a peak event for several reasons: (1) it 
moves between technical details, general approach, the involvement of other systems, and 
managerial translations; (2) the system is an integral piece of the larger project; (3) the 
discussion ends unresolved, and; (4) it shows good examples of experts and review panel 
members “talking past each other.”  We use the phrase “talking past each other” as a symbolic 
representation indicating two people participating in the same discussion but fundamentally 
having a different debate – often times factual versus epistemological - resulting in an 
unsuccessful or unresolved debate.     
To analyze and navigate through a peak, each question and the corresponding response 
was labeled as a “Move.” Each move represents a time when a knowledge claim was questioned 
and then explained, justified, negotiated or defended by either the project expert or a manager.  
The thermal design of the CubeSat is complex and dynamic with the engineer having to 
design for drastically different external thermal environments while balancing the changing 
thermal demands of internal systems.  For example, the transponder produces heat when 
operating, and the propellant cools rapidly when being used. All of the thermal requirements had 
to be accomplished within the given power budget of 3 watts. As an additional challenge, most 
of BioSentinel’s subsystems were being designed at the same time as the thermal control, so the 
thermal control engineer needed to allow for flexibility in the system and in the design process to 
account for new or changing information that often occurs in design. To meet these 
requirements, the engineer utilized several strategies including the use of heaters, surface 
treatments, and adjustable plastic washers that can be “tuned” to create different levels of 
thermal connectivity between objects.  
Findings 
The findings focus on one peak event that occurred during the thermal environment 
presentation. A detailed description of the peak event can be found in Table 2.  
Peak Event: Thermal Environments and Uncertainties 
The peak event began with move 1 and a general inquiry from a reviewer about whose 
responsibility it was to insulate the dispenser on the SLS, which is the main external interface for 
the CubeSat. (Recall, the dispenser is what secures the CubeSat to the SLS and is responsible for 
ejecting the CubeSat into space.) The Project Manager responded from the audience that it had 
not been decided yet, but there are ongoing negotiations involving the other CubeSats that would 
be launched with BioSentinel, the SLS team, and other stakeholders involved in the launch 
procedures.  The manager implied that there was a path forward on how to resolve this 
uncertainty and that he felt confident that the people doing it were on track, although he 
acknowledged that there is uncertainty in the current design.  
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Moves 2 and 3 transition to heat rejection mechanisms and thermal margins and away 
from questions about the insulation. The project expert responded as the question directly 
pertained to the expertise of the project engineer and their responsibilities. While the engineer 
briefly covered surface coatings earlier in their presentation, they did not give a detailed 
explanation of how surface coatings affect the thermal design (i.e. discussing how surface 
coatings help reject heat in space). The project expert used theory to further explain and justify 
this design decision so that the questioner understood the importance of the surface coatings and 
how they work. The thermal margins (move 3) had not been discussed directly in the 
presentation but had been alluded to when it was stated that the design was built to be flexible to 
account for uncertainties and future changes at multiple timeframes from before launch to 
operations. So while the project expert had implied this previously, the reviewer was either 
unclear in their understanding or were looking for a specific piece of information tied to another 
interest of theirs. The project expert went into a relatively detailed explanation of their thermal 
design margins explaining how they are using a model and sensitivity analysis before concluding 
that many different situations had been considered. Therefore, while the project expert 
understood the complexity of the design and discussed the actual quantified margins of 
uncertainty, we see by move 4’s question that this explanation was insufficient for the reviewer. 
At this point, we see the manager interject in move 4 in an attempt to explain in a different 
manner by indicating that some parts can be changed out to help with the thermal balancing, 
suggesting the use of a simulator, and insisting that the project expert has done everything they 
can at this point. At a CDR there can still be uncertainties about the overall project and its 
interfaces, but those uncertainties need to be resolved soon in order to allow building to begin 
soon after the review, so these interactions had significant weight for the project. An incomplete 
or impractical thermal design could prevent the project from launching. 
Table 2. Thermal Peak Event ‘Moves,’ showing the discussion that was observed by the 
researchers and an interpretation of the implications and meaning of the discussion.  
  Discussion Meaning 
M
ov
e 
1 
Question Who insulates? (referring to launch dispenser) Dispenser insulation can have an 
impact on maintaining the thermal 
environment of the CubeSat during 
the time it is sitting in the sun in 
Florida in the middle of summer 
and once it enters outer space. 
Maintaining the temperature within 
a certain range is vital for the 
success of the science component 
of the mission. At this stage of the 
design, there are still uncertainties 
about insulation on the interfaces 
with the payload.  Response 
(Project Manager) Not the expert's job. It still 
needs to be negotiated with SLS. [Contractor] 
will do the negotiating. (Engineering Manager) 
We also have some thermo issues with 
batteries, so everyone else is pushing in the 
same direction. 
M
ov
e 
2 
Question 
(Division Manager) You talked about the 
heating for biology but what about the heat 
rejection mechanisms? 
While preserving the biological 
samples is of utmost importance, 
the reviewer is aware that other 
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Response 
(project expert) The actual surface coatings of 
the spacecraft. The problem is basically 
ensuring you can "eject" or dump heat 
components of the CubeSat 
produce heat and understands the 
significance of what this means to 
the rest of the CubeSat. The 
balanced thermal environment 
needs to be. 
M
ov
e 
3 
Question 
(reviewer) What kind of thermal margin are 
you designing to? 
The thermal margin provides 
leeway within the design to protect 
against uncertain conditions. A 
greater margin within the design is 
a way of protecting against 
significant unknowns at the current 
level of design maturity. 
Response 
(project expert) Don't have enough definition 
on pre-launch, so we're trying to drive that with 
our requirements. We're using a model that is 
"… actually very complicated" and goes on to 
talk about sensitivity analysis. To answer the 
question, many different conditions are 
considered.  
M
ov
e 
4 
 
 
Question 
 
(reviewer) When will you have enough 
information (heat data) [to know the margins 
and how you can change the design]? 
The thermal design is as complete 
as it can be at this point in time and 
the engineer has created a design 
that is flexible to account for the 
unknowns. One of the managers is 
explaining this again, which 
implies that reviewer is still not 
convinced that information will 
arrive early enough to inform the 
design. 
Response 
(Project Manager) We're unpowered [before 
launch] so there is nothing the expert can do. 
Potentially can get a thermal simulator [to study 
the environment]. (Engineering Manager) Can 
change out some parts to help with thermal 
balancing. Conductive and radiative paths are 
represented in the model minus [transponder]. 
M
ov
e 
5 
Question 
(reviewer) But it'll be late [in arriving in your 
design process]? 
Completing the thermal design 
within the timeline has 
implications for other aspects of 
the project. 
Response 
(Division Manager) We'll get thermal info first. 
(Engineering Manager) we might get a 
simulator to model thermal output. But the 
expert has done I think a fantastic job leaving 
everything flexible.  
M
ov
e 
6 
Question/Statement  
(reviewer) I am very nervous, you basically 
don't know the thermal system 
Reviewer implies that the thermal 
system is unknown. Review chair 
is trying to focus the conversation. 
Response  (review chair) “Stop talking” 
M
ov
e 
7 
Question  
(review chair) What if it can't meet [the thermal 
environments you learn about]? You have a lot 
of unknowns and I don't see any mitigations or 
worst-case. 
Echoing the reviewer, the review 
chair describes concern about 
uncertainty, focusing on worst-
case conditions. The Division 
Manager questions whether any 
design to protect against worst case 
could fit in the time and technical 
constraints here. Response  
(Division Manager) If we [designed to] worst 
case than nothing would fly. (Project Manager) 
remember battery [duration length concern],that 
affects everyone.  
M   Question (reviewer) Are there heaters on the dispensers? 
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Response  
(Project Manager) No we're too unimportant.  Heaters on the dispenser could 
assist in maintaining temperature 
control after the launch of the SLS 
and before the CubeSat deploys. 
But, it would be expensive to add 
those and could perturb the SLS 
rocket design 
M
ov
e 
9 Question 
(reviewer) One of the things that concerns me 
is the payload needs +/- 1C but your 
temperature sensors are +/- 0.5C so isn't that 
pretty close? Does that include calibration? 
Concerned about the margin 
between what the temperature 
sensors can detect and what the 
payload needs to be maintained at 
Response 
(project expert) Yes! Small makes it harder. 
This is a very challenging spacecraft.  
(Engineering Manager) Problem is not unique 
to BioSentinel. Other [secondary] payloads are 
having problems because operating range of 
batteries 
C
on
cl
us
io
n 
Action: Request 
follow-up action 
Reviewers discussion indicated concern about 
the thermal design including pre-launch, on 
ascent and before BioSentinel separation. 
This conversation could not be 
resolved to the review team’s  
satisfaction and therefore resulted 
in a RID (Request for Item 
Disposition). 
Move 5 transitions back to a more global-in-scale question and refers to the timeline of 
the project and when the project team will have more information to be able to complete their 
design. Again, the manager steps in and answers this question and compliments the project 
expert on their design as the design-to-date addresses the current state of knowledge.  
Continuing on, we see the reviewer in Move 6 state “you basically don’t know the 
thermal system,” followed by the review chair calling for a pause in the discussion. The review 
chair goes on in Move 7 to clarify the concern in an attempt to understand what mitigations or 
worst-case scenarios have been thought of during the design process. This required an extended 
discussion to negotiate the criteria by which the credibility and relevance of design components 
were assessed and to create a shared meaning of what “worst-case” meant.  This discussion was 
centrally important to the technical success of the project and was unequivocally an 
“engineering” discussion, even though it was light on technical detail.  This aspect of 
engineering work is focused more on the epistemic criteria by which knowledge is assessed (i.e. 
on the foundations of the knowledge system), rather than the technical knowledge of the design 
itself. 
Move 8 relates back to move 1 and asks about heaters on the dispenser, which is an 
external interface for the CubeSat. Again, the manager answers the question as the dispenser is 
beyond the scope of the project expert’s negotiating powers and responsibilities. Little discussion 
ensues which implies that there is an existing shared understanding of what it means to have 
“heaters on the dispenser” and the thermal design implications.   
Move 9 shifts back to an expert specific question and asks about sensors. The response by 
the project expert conveyed excitement, as if the question being asked indicated to the project 
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expert that the review team was starting to understand the complexity of the design and the 
issues surrounding it. A manager also adds an additional global perspective to this discussion to 
demonstrate that this particular project is not the only one dealing with the issues that have been 
debated. The question in and of itself signaled to the project expert that they were starting to 
make some headway in bringing the two groups to a similar point in their understanding. The 
review team still wanted to have a follow-up discussion and analysis, which in NASA parlance is 
captured through a Request for Item Disposition (RID). A RID flags the issue as something that 
future NASA managers should track and discuss, and must be resolved with future involvement 
from the review team.  
After the RID was written up, the project expert then continued with their presentation 
and attempted to alleviate some of the review board’s concerns by showing additional models. 
Again, while the peak event had resulted in a RID, we see the project expert attempting to 
negotiate domain boundaries by using different forms of evidence. The overall review 
culminated in a recommendation that the BioSentinel project had successfully met the 
requirements of the CDR and that it was recommended to proceed to the next design phase.   
 
Discussion 
In most academic settings, engineering is organized into content-based domains or 
divisions.  In some ways, NASA similarly organizes knowledge into content-based domains, for 
example by assigning personnel to the team based on categories such as “mechanical,” 
“electrical,” or “thermal.” While this may be how they administratively deal with structuring a 
project, we see during the peak event that these content-based domains can quickly dissolve 
during important negotiations. Instead, interactions were based on domains of responsibility and 
trust. Responsibility refers to what an individual is accountable for guaranteeing, with specific 
emphasis on what they are expected to be the ‘expert’ about. Move 1 is an explicit example of 
this when the manager says that questions about the insulation prior to launch are “not the 
expert’s job.” Although the content was clearly and directly related to the expertise of the 
thermal engineer, their responsibility only extended to the outer surface of BioSentinel itself, and 
not toward external interfaces such as the payload dispenser.  The project expert was accountable 
for guaranteeing that the thermal control system would maintain internal temperatures under the 
expected conditions; negotiations concerning the accuracy or precision of the prediction of those 
conditions were outside of their responsibilities. 
Exploring these different levels of responsibilities, we see the project expert’s job, as 
defined by the peak event, is analogous to having a narrow-but-deep area of responsibility. This 
is seen in Moves 2 and 3 when the project expert answers content specific questions and goes 
into detail about the design and analysis of the system in isolation.  The project expert’s 
responses drew from technical details and a deep understanding of the system to provide 
evidence that their design will accomplish its goals.  The continued and escalating questioning of 
the reviewer does not question the project expert’s evidence or technical expertise, but instead 
implies that the precision might not be sufficient due to uncertainty in the projects’ broader 
assumptions about its interfaces. 
Unlike the project expert, the managers’ responsibilities focus on verifying that the 
thermal design is trustworthy and can interface and communicate with the systems and anticipate 
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the changes it will need to deal with. We see an example of this in Move 1 where the 
Engineering Manager and Project Manager are talking about a negotiation with a contractor and 
a thermal issue with batteries.  The managers use a similar approach as the thermal system expert 
in their responses; they use their deep understanding of the system (the human system of 
engineers in this case, as opposed to the thermal control system) to present evidence in support 
of the design decisions. They also have a sense of the appropriate amount of uncertainty that can 
exist at different phases in a project’s development, and tried to defend that their work was good 
given the current state of the design. 
Further up the management ladder, we see the Division Manager responsibilities are 
focused on the need to be able to trust the Project Manager and Engineering Manager and make 
sure that the overall approach is appropriate. This is evident in Move 7 where the Division 
Manager’s argument is based on a deep understanding of the broader managerial system.  The 
Division Manager addresses the reviewer’s assumption that all designs should be robust against 
“worst case” conditions by arguing that this approach is not appropriate for this particular project 
given the constraints on time and information.  It is worth noting that each level of managerial 
responsibility includes more people and therefore requires a broader awareness of the project 
systems and their interactions.  
Conclusion  
This exchange is an example of a peak event because it marked one of the few 
discussions that did not result in a fairly immediate (less than 10 minutes) agreement among the 
participants.  We argue that this is because the disagreements presented here are fundamentally 
about epistemology: What level of certainty is required? What is acceptable? How well 
understood are the thermal systems? Can you trust a model to be reliable in the relevant system 
boundaries?  However, these questions were never directly addressed in the discussion. There 
was extensive back and forth conversation about uncertainty in the thermal environment but 
there was likely no way to more definitively answer the question until the design maturity and 
understanding of the mission environment improved4. The debate between reviewer and project 
managers and experts thus depends on epistemic issues and value preferences about risk that 
cannot be objectively assessed (Douglas, 2009). Instead, in contrast to most other disagreements 
during the entire review, this disagreement needed to be settled by an authority5. Such an 
intervention helped clarify the point of the conversation and to forestall what could have been a 
much longer discussion. 
While it may be unsurprising that a group of engineers and scientists preferred to discuss 
technical details instead of epistemological nuances such as acceptable levels of uncertainty, this 
preference is significant because it marks a basic feature of the design process. The reviewers 
                                                      
4 There may even be uncertainty after BioSentinel has eventually flown – successful or not, there may be difficulty 
in knowing exactly what happened as well as how BioSentinel might behave in periods of abnormal solar radiation 
that could be part of the uncertainty space. For a comparable example, see ongoing conversations about how safe 
that Space Shuttle was (Gerstenmaier, February 2017 briefing to the Commercial Space advisory committee). 
Engineers learn a lot from successes or failures but always have uncertainty about how the design would perform in 
other conditions. 
5 Note that the “stop talking” from the review chair to the review member in move 6 was recorded in the jottings as a 
direct quote and, although it was delivered with some warmth and humor, it still marks an unusually directive 
statement in the collegial atmosphere of the review. That said, one of the authors can attest from experience that 
strong statements and pointed conversation is not an infrequent event inside an engineering context.   
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and presenters negotiated many complicated issues, including who’s responsibility it is to resolve 
key issues.  Even in this brief excerpt they developed a shared understanding about expected 
insulation levels, heat rejection mechanisms, thermally reflective surface coatings, and a thermal 
model that required hours of computation time per run.  It can be easier to focus on specific 
questions rather than to look holistically at the entire system. The question, “do you know 
enough about the thermal conditions?” seems relatively simple in comparison.  The amount of 
time spent on this question suggests that even simplistic processes for addressing epistemological 
concerns could significantly affect engineering projects. Explicitly addressing macro-issues 
about knowledge, such as uncertainty and system boundary, can be an important complement to 
engineers’ discussion of focused analysis of components and technical details. 
Engineering students do not get much practice or instruction in explicitly negotiating 
knowledge system boundaries and epistemic standards on uncertainty. Although this analysis is 
limited to a single discussion, we argue that such discussions are important in many engineering 
projects. Educators can incorporate the findings here into their classroom practices by providing 
more system-level context but less definition (e.g. ill-defined) to students when assigning 
problems, forcing students to think beyond the necessary calculations and more about how their 
work interacts with other components and the system as a whole.   Understanding how engineers 
communicate across different epistemic and disciplinary viewpoints is another step towards 
creating an engineering curriculum that more closely aligns with engineering practice. 
Furthermore, it shows that engineering knowledge is not only something to be possessed but 
instead something that must be negotiated, at varying levels of uncertainty, as part of an 
interconnected and socially situated knowledge system. 
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